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A NEW PRODUCT FOR THE STATE CORPORATION LAW MARKET:
AUDIT COMMITTEE CERTIFICATIONS
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
In the swirling corporate governance reforms led by SOX, the SEC, SROs and
PCAOB, states are playing minor roles at best. State absence leaves missing a
potentially critical link in the evolving US corporate governance circle. The circle is
drawn as follows: state corporation law charges boards of directors with managing
corporations and authorizes board committees; SOX charges audit committees with
certain tasks, including supervising external auditors; the SEC and SROs require audit
committee characteristics like independence and compel disclosure; and PCAOB now
requires external auditors to evaluate audit committee effectiveness. This last step could
close the circle except that auditors performing this evaluation generate conflicts with
state corporation law, conflicts between auditors and audit committees and face other
limitations. These conflicts and limitations can be neutralized in an audit committee
evaluation exercise conducted by newly-created state agencies staffed with experts in
state corporation law such as retired lawyers and judges or academics. These newlycreated state agencies could thus square the newly-forming corporate governance circle.
The paper presents and evaluates this concept. It reviews the central role audit
committees play in corporate governance; considers existing mechanisms that promote
committee effectiveness—state fiduciary duties, SEC-SRO disclosure rules, and
traditional auditing—noting the limits of each. It considers PCAOB’s new auditing
standards requiring auditors to evaluate audit committee effectiveness, showing both the
perceived need for such an evaluation and inherent limits on auditor capabilities to
render this evaluation effectively. This review leads to state agencies as possible
providers of this evaluation and certification. The paper sketches the outlines for creating
and running such state agencies. It then assesses the likelihood that this concept would
be accepted by various corporate constituents. Likely supporters include users and
producers of financial information and the auditing and legal professions. More
uncertain is SEC support, given a new model of corporate-governance production in
which the SEC uses various instrumentalities, like SROs and PCAOB, to federalize
corporate governance. State receptivity depends in part upon and is evaluated according
to rival corporation law production models (a race to the top or bottom; interest group;
or state versus federal). The paper concludes by lamenting that in the evolving
corporate-governance production model, missing links like this one are unlikely to be
corrected by state or federal law—unless private-sector agents likely to support such
concepts lobby for them.
*

Professor of Law & Business, Boston College. © 2004. All rights reserved. Thanks to
Tamar Frankel, David Henry, Renee Jones, Bob Thompson, Rod Ward and Chuck
Yablon. This paper was prepared for presentation at the 17th Bi-Annual University of
Kansas School of Business/Deloitte-Touche Auditing Conference and the University of
Connecticut Law School Conference on Corporate Governance (both in April 2004).
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INTRODUCTION
Audit committees of corporate boards of directors are central to corporate
governance for many corporations. Their effectiveness in supervising financial managers
and overseeing the financial reporting process is important to promote reliable financial
statements. This centrality suggests that it is likewise important for investors and others
to have a basis for justifiable confidence in audit committee effectiveness. At present,
there is no such mechanism. This Article explains why, considers a way states can
provide it and assesses as low the likelihood that states will do so.
State corporation law is designed to produce justifiable investor confidence in
board audit committees through a simple structure: shareholders elect boards of directors
and state fiduciary duty law requires directors to manage corporations in the best interests
of shareholders and the corporation.1 The business judgment rule reposes governance
power in boards to decide whether to use an audit committee, which directors should
serve on the audit committee, the scope of its duties and how it should operate.2
Perceived failures in the traditional state corporation law approach led Congress
to enact federal law mandating a particular approach to audit committees and their role.
The federal approach includes mandates under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to staff
audit committees with independent directors and to vest them with power to supervise a
corporation’s external auditors.3 Other federal requirements impose reporting and
disclosure obligations under rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC)
and its instrumentalities the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market
(misleadingly dubbed self-regulatory organizations or SROs).4
1

E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2003).

State corporation law is thus the foundation of corporate governance. It provides that
corporations are managed by a board of directors and authorizes, but does not require, the
board to act through committees. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (2003).

2

3

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 776-78; 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)58 & 7201(a)(3). SOX does not require boards of directors to form an
audit committee. But without one, the entire board is deemed that committee and is
subject to requisite federal laws and regulations. Id.
4

E.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.06-07 (Nov.
2003); NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES §§ 4200(a)(14)-(15) & 4350(c)-(d) (2003). The
SROs are not really self-regulatory but are functional instrumentalities of the SEC. See
Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State
Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 968-69 (2003); infra Part V.
Their listing requirements are not really standards but excruciatingly-specific rules. See
William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small
State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003); infra note 47.
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SOX also created a new audit standard-setting body, the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), to provide standards governing audits of public
companies. In a proposed standard, PCAOB proposed to require external auditors to
review audit committee effectiveness.5 This proposal could be useful, but poses conflicts
between auditors and audit committees and is difficult to square with state corporation
law.6 While PCAOB’s final standard retracted, in part, it still requires external auditors
to consider audit committee effectiveness as part of their overall review of a
corporation’s internal control over financial reporting.7
PCAOB’s proposal reveals a hole in the corporate governance system that this
admixture of state and federal law creates. Audit committees are central but no one other
than boards—and, after the fact, shareholders and courts—has power to oversee them.
All SOX does is mandate characteristics and functions; all the SEC and SROs do is
mandate characteristics, reports and disclosure. All PCAOB ended up doing—after
flagging the issue of audit committee review—is requiring auditors to include an audit
committee review as part of the auditor’s more general assessment of a company’s
internal control over financial reporting.
The resulting corporate governance system reveals two major problems that this
paper considers. The first is the tension between state and federal law. State corporation
law trusts boards of directors to choose the right set of management tools for a
corporation. Federal law now provides governmental mandates specifying parameters of
the audit function, whether or not a board believes it is necessary. But neither alone is
complete and, even when combined, remains incomplete.
While the federal regime specifies audit committee composition and function, it
respects federalism limits by not further specifying how that committee’s effectiveness is
PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), A PROPOSED STANDARD
CONCERNING AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter
PCAOB’s Proposed Standard].
5

6

See Part II, infra.

7

PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), AUDITING STANDARD
NO. 2: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN
CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (March 9, 2004), ¶¶ 55-59
[hereinafter Auditing Standard No. 2]. [Note: This auditing standard is subject to SEC
approval, expected easily given SEC’s substantial role in the preparation process.]
PCAOB adopted Auditing Standard No. 2 to require external auditors to evaluate the
effectiveness of the audit committee’s oversight of a corporation’s financial reporting and
related internal control. This evaluation will be part of the auditor’s new task, under
SOX, of attesting to managerial assertions concerning the effectiveness of internal
control. When Auditing Standard No. 2 was released for public comment as a proposed
standard, the proposal appeared to require a separate and complete evaluation.

4

to be evaluated; while state corporation law provides a framework for this evaluation, it
does not provide any mechanism to conduct ongoing review. This missing link creates an
opportunity for states to contribute meaningfully to discussions of corporate governance
reform SOX prompted.
As Congress, the SEC, SROs and PCAOB—along with hundreds of assorted
professionals—have developed a range of policies, proposals and ideas, Delaware and
other states have stayed on the sidelines (apart from perceived adjustments in their
approach to the common law of fiduciary obligation).8 States interested in retaining and
attracting corporate chartering business, from Delaware to Nevada, have a golden
opportunity here: to provide a mechanism for a mandatory or optional audit committee
evaluation and effectiveness certification.9
The second problem concerns how to monitor the monitors. The federallyprescribed audit committee is directed to supervise the external auditor and PCAOB
proposed to have the external auditor evaluate the audit committee. While such 360degree evaluations can work, the proposal is both jarring and difficult to square with state
corporation law. It remains jarring and difficult to square with state corporation law even
in the more modest form of having auditors review audit committee effectiveness as part
of the auditor’s overall review of internal control.
To address these two problems, this Article considers a state-agency based
approach to audit committee evaluation.10
A branch of state government could be
vested with power to conduct a periodic evaluation and provide certification; this could
be made mandatory or optional. If made optional, corporations could signal to investors a
higher level of confidence in the integrity of their audit committees. This signal could be
conveyed in how a state’s corporations are denominated. In Delaware, for example,
corporations opting out would continue to be called “Delaware corporations;” those
opting in would enjoy the boosted designation “certified Delaware corporation.”
The state-agency approach would avoid many of the thorny problems of having
auditors evaluate audit committees. It would eliminate conflicts of interest between
auditors and audit committees and give responsibility to those possessing requisite
See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform,
29 J. CORP. L. ___ (forthcoming 2004).
8

9

Delaware is the country’s leading state of incorporation for large companies. Some see
Nevada as attempting to compete with Delaware. E.g., Dave Berns, Shareholders win
ITT Decision: Will Judge Pro’s Decision Help Nevada Become the “Delaware of the
West”?, 5 NEVADA LAWYER 22 (Dec. 1997).

Other approaches are possible. For example, state corporation law statutes could be
amended to require boards of directors periodically to evaluate and certify their audit
committees as effective; these amendments could make the exercise mandatory or
optional (an opt-out based on a shareholder vote for example).
10
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expertise using objective criteria. It would also create a mechanism furnishing publiclydisclosed affirmative assurance, in contrast to the more opaque, negative assurance that
PCAOB’s approach would enable auditors to provide when opining on a company’s
internal control over financial reporting.
The state-agency approach has limits. Some see SOX’s partial federalization of
corporate governance as rejecting the existing state law system of audit committee
oversight of auditors and auditor oversight of audit committees and management. If so,
the state agency concept can be criticized as simply a return or reenactment of that weak
world. On the other hand, the SOX approach is incomplete, respecting some federalism
limits. Accordingly, states retain a significant role in corporate governance and a
mechanism such as a state-agency audit committee evaluation function could help them
play it—and could even lead to reinvigorating traditional conceptions of fiduciary
obligation.
Despite likely appeal of the concept to users and preparers of financial statements
documented in Part IV below, the concept is not likely to be adopted by many states (or
any) absent substantial encouragement from those constituents. Regulators, including
PCAOB and the SEC, may also be less than receptive to the concept. PCAOB projects
itself as an additional source of corporate governance. It will have territorial interests in
maximizing its regulatory reach. The SEC, which oversees PCAOB, may wish to
preserve maximum power in PCAOB as an additional means for its own ability to control
corporate governance, as it does using SROs, without direct encroachment on state
corporation law.11
Apart from uncertain regulatory support, states also may lack incentives to pursue
the concept. Predictions of state inclinations regarding this concept depend on adopting
one of several rival theories of state corporation law production: states compete with each
other in a race to the top or bottom; they compete to benefit interest groups such as
lawyers and investment bankers; they compete against the federal government; or they
comprise one component of a multi-pronged model involving state, federal and SRO
sources.12
If the race is to the bottom, states likely will reject the concept, but if to the top or
to help interest groups, they might accept it. Under the more complex models,
predictions are more difficult. However, it appears that the SEC is developing an
elaborate method of creating corporate governance using instrumentalities such as SROs
and PCAOB and may prefer using these arms over which it has direct statutory power,
rather than states over which it holds only indirect power. States facing even this indirect
SEC pressure may be reluctant to innovate corporate governance reforms the SEC would
disfavor, even if they are in the best interests of corporations, investors and the public.
This is one price of the increasing functional federalization of corporate governance.
11

See Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance, supra, note 4, at 968-69.

12

See Part V, infra.
6

This Article (I) assesses the need for any formal evaluation of audit committee
effectiveness in light of existing alternatives providing assurance; (II) reviews PCAOB’s
standard for auditor evaluation of audit committee effectiveness to show how its limits
point directly to creating state mechanisms for this function; (III) sketches the outlines of
such a program’s design and administration; (IV) draws from public comments made on
PCAOB’s proposed standard to suggest that a state-agency approach would garner
widespread support from investors and managers and from the auditing and legal
professions; and (V) concludes by lamenting that despite virtues and probable field
support, regulators and states may not support the concept.

I. NEED AND PARTIAL SOLUTIONS
The audit committee plays a central role in overseeing management, financial
reporting and internal control over financial reporting, among other duties. Effective
audit committees can be important components of corporate governance, by aiding in
deterring, detecting and preventing fraudulent financial reporting and thus protecting
investors and other constituents. In addition, investors benefit from an understanding of
audit committee roles in general and within particular organizations. Although these
propositions are uncontroversial, an unresolved issue is how best to promote
understanding and effectiveness. A combination of substantive duties, disclosure rules
and independent assurance is desirable—much of which is in place.
A. Existing Substantive Duties
Longstanding principles of state corporation law provide that boards of directors
manage the business and affairs of a corporation as fiduciaries.13 Audit committee
members are members of the board of directors. As such, they are obliged to discharge
state corporation law’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, subject to deference under the
business judgment rule. Duties include assuring a corporation’s compliance with
applicable law. Breach of these duties exposes directors to liability to shareholders in
private litigation, subject to state law provisions authorizing corporate charters to
exculpate them from personal liability in certain cases.14 These principles provide a
measure of discipline on audit committee members in performing their duties. But given
the business judgment rule and the prevalence of exculpatory charter provisions, critics
regard this arrangement as insufficient.

13

E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2003); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).

E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003) (for money damages for breaches of the
duty of care, but not for injunctive relief or for breaches of the duty of loyalty or acts not
taken in good faith); ALI-ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 2.02(b)(4)(1990) (similar, but
without the limitations for breaches of duty of loyalty or good faith).
14
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B. Existing Disclosure Rules
SRO rules address the disclosure aspect of audit committee functions. These rules
require that audit committees have a charter, disclose it publicly, evaluate its own
performance, affirm charter compliance and report on these matters to the full board of
directors and to the SRO.15 These rules seek to impose accountability and discipline on
audit committees. The charter-and-disclosure components also provide investors and
gatekeepers with sources to understand audit committee operations. Whether these
requirements are sufficient to assure audit committee effectiveness is not entirely clear.
An independent evaluation and certification would provide valuable additional
assurances.
C. Existing Audit Practice
Who might provide such assurances? The auditor is a logical choice, in part,
because it also needs such an understanding to conduct its primary audit functions. Thus
an existing solution is traditional audit practice. Auditors conducting traditional financial
statement audits apply tests of internal controls to help plan the scope of their audits.
This probing typically includes some dealing with the audit committee. Many financial
calamities that brewed during the late 1990s are attributed to internal control failure,
however, including within audit committees. These audit failures cast doubt on the
reliability of traditional audit practice to provide requisite assurances.
D. Audits of Internal Control
Responding to these audit failures, SOX directed PCAOB to develop auditing
standards concerning attestations of managerial assertions of internal control
effectiveness.16 A key feature of the attestation process requires auditors to assess the
effectiveness of audit committee oversight concerning internal control over financial
reporting. The chief justification for this assessment is the central role that audit
committees play in financial reporting.
PCOAB proposed a standard providing for such an auditor assessment of audit
committee effectiveness. For reasons considered in the next section, however, PCAOB’s
final standard (Auditing Standard No. 2) retracted from this full assessment in favor of a
partial assessment as a component of the auditor’s more general audit of internal control
over financial reporting.

15

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.06-07 (Nov. 4,
2003); NASDAQ By-Laws, Art. 9, § 5; NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, §§
4200(a)(14)-(15) & 4350(c)-(d) (2003).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 404(b) & 103(a)(2)(A); Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
at ___.
16
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A significant consequence of the difference between PCAOB’s proposed and final
standards concerns transparency. As a separate evaluation, the proposed standard
appeared designed to produce disclosure concerning an audit committee’s effectiveness,
to provide a form of positive assurance to users of financial statements. As a mere
component of the auditor’s overall evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
it becomes opaque, less visible to financial statement users. It is a form of negative
assurance: that the auditor did not find the audit committee ineffective.17
This difference minimizes some of the difficulties associated with auditors
performing this function, including conflicts, expertise and objectivity discussed next. It
opens the question of whether audit committee evaluation assignments that auditors are
institutionally incapable of performing should be performed by another party.

II. INHERENT LIMITS OF THE AUDITOR EVALUATION
PCAOB’s Auditing Standard No. 2 requires auditors to evaluate audit committee
effectiveness in overseeing external financial reporting and internal control over financial
reporting. This raises questions concerning the relationship of this exercise to state
corporation law’s requirement that boards perform this function (a duty SRO listing
standards restate). It also creates conflicts between the auditor and the audit committee,
which SOX anoints as the auditor’s supervisor. PCAOB’s proposed standard elicited
criticism along these lines;18 Auditing Standard No. 2 responds by emphasizing that (1) it
does not intend to supplant the board’s responsibilities; (2) the auditor’s evaluation is not
separate or distinct but part of its control environment assessment; and (3) conflicts are
inevitable. These responses leave open major issues concerning inherent limits of the
auditor evaluation exercise and invite considering alternative providers of audit
committee evaluation services.
Auditing Standard No. 2 provides that auditors evaluating audit committees assess
committee member independence. This raises questions concerning whether auditors
possess requisite expertise to make what are essentially legal judgments. PCAOB’s
proposed standard directed auditors to evaluate audit committee compliance with
requirements of SOX, the SEC and SROs; Auditing Standard No. 2 deleted these
provisions in response to criticism that they are beyond an auditor’s expertise. This
raises questions concerning whether these elements are important for evaluating audit
committee effectiveness and, if so, also indicates need to consider alternative service
providers. Auditing Standard No. 2 specifies a variety of other factors relevant to the
evaluation, none of which lends itself to measurement by objective criteria usually used
in auditing. This raises both sorts of questions: whether auditors possess requisite
17

Auditing Standard No. 2 triggers public disclosure of ineffective audit committee
oversight only when this amounts to a “material weakness” in internal control over
financial reporting. Auditing Standard No. 2, at ¶ 59. See infra note 30.
18

See Part IV, infra.
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expertise and whether alternative providers of audit committee evaluations should be
sought.
A. Conflicts
Two classes of conflicts arise from having auditors evaluate audit committee
effectiveness: (1) legal conflicts between Auditing Standard No. 2 and various laws and
(2) structural conflicts between auditors and audit committees and between management
and audit committees.
1. Legal. — Auditing Standard No. 2’s audit committee evaluation provisions
can interfere with the allocation of responsibilities established under state corporation law
and SOX. Under state law, boards of directors must manage the business and affairs of a
corporation; under SOX, audit committees must discharge the board-oversight duty
concerning the external auditor’s qualifications and performance.
SOX’s approach was designed to correct for the conflict between auditors and
managers that could be seen as a systemic weakness (auditors became beholden to
management and softened their professional skepticism). The evaluation role Auditing
Standard No. 2 assigns to auditors puts them in the position of evaluating the audit
committee, an organ of the board of directors. This can be seen to reintroduce the
conflict in a different guise. It thus may be seen to conflict with the goals of those laws.
The nature of audit committee oversight adds to legal conflicts. Consider the
nature of director obligations under state corporation law compared with professional
techniques auditors are trained to apply. Directors have fiduciary duties to their
corporations and stockholders. They must act in their best interests when discharging
statutory responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of a corporation. A welldeveloped body of common law applies. Doctrines include the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care, along with the business judgment rule. These doctrines provide a judicial
framework allowing directors leeway to exercise business judgment, while keeping
behavior within acceptable boundaries.19
In contrast to judicial approaches to supervising directors, auditors use
professional skepticism in their tasks, routinely second-guessing management decisions.20
This approach, when applied to audit committee evaluations, threatens to alter audit
committee behavior: from that contemplated under state corporation law with deference
to business judgments into a more rule-oriented and constricting arrangement perhaps not
Commentators disagree concerning whether state corporation law draws the boundaries
faithfully to legitimate norms. Despite disagreement, there is no question that the auditor
review would apply a fundamentally different approach.
19

E.g., VINCENT M. O’REILLY, ET AL., MONTGOMERY’S AUDITING (12th ed. 1998), at 4.5
(due professional care of auditors requires the auditor to exercise professional
skepticism).
20
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in the best interest of a corporation or its shareholders.21 It could lead to highly
disruptive and unnecessary disagreements. Hence Auditing Standard No. 2 is somewhat
at odds with state corporation law.22
Consider also the different standards of legal obligation owed by directors
compared to auditors. When acting through audit committees, these state corporation law
fiduciary duties remain applicable to directors. Auditors are not fiduciaries for their
clients or client stockholders. At best, law requires auditors to act professionally and not
to commit negligence or fraud.23 They are contract parties, not fiduciaries. Having
contract parties supervise fiduciaries turns a traditional legal hierarchy upside-down. It
creates an incoherent corporate governance system.
Obligations of directors and auditors under federal securities laws differ as well.
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,24 for example, both are entitled to assert
due diligence defenses to defeat claims of negligence in discharging their
responsibilities.25 However, directors are responsible for the entire contents of a
registration statement and exposed to related liability; auditors are subject to liability only
for those portions of the registration statement they are responsible for preparing as
experts.26

21

See generally William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules
Versus Standards Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003) (assessing limits of SOXinspired regulatory urge to develop standards-based accounting concepts as opposed to
rules-based concepts to constrain managerial and auditor rent-seeking).
SOX interferes with state corporation law on specific subjects. For example, it bans
loans to corporate insiders and authorizes federalized derivative lawsuits to recover
profits generated in violation of new blackout rules. SOX, §§ 306, 402. But it does not
purport to alter state corporation law’s charge that directors manage the business and
affairs of the corporation or preempt the business judgment rule. Congress may have the
prerogative to take these steps; PCAOB does not.
22

23

See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (discussing scienter
standard and due diligence defense); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983) (adopting preponderance of evidence standard rather than clear and convincing
standard); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing
negligence standard and requirements of pleading fraud with particularity).
24

15 U.S.C. § 77(k).

E.g., Escott v. BarChris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(reviewing and rejecting asserted due diligence defenses under Section 11 made by
various corporate officers and directors and the corporation’s external auditor).
25

26

See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207-08 (1976):
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Auditing Standard No. 2 grapples with these challenges in limited ways. First, it
implores auditors to recognize that boards are responsible for evaluating the performance
and effectiveness of audit committees.27 This is of course an obvious statement of law,
fact, and authority that PCAOB cannot change. Second, Auditing Standard No. 2
declares that it “does not suggest” that auditors are responsible for performing a “separate
and distinct” audit committee evaluation.28 Equally important, however, it emphasizes
that auditors assess committee effectiveness because of the central role audit committees
play in a corporation’s control environment.29
These provisions are helpful in minimizing conflicts between Auditing Standard
No. 2 and state corporation law; they do not eliminate them. Suppose a board makes a
business judgment not to appoint a financial expert to the audit committee (optional
under SOX and SRO listing standards and permitted by state corporation law), and makes
a legal judgment concerning how and when to disclose this (required by SOX). But
suppose the auditor disagrees with both conclusions. What happens?
In a traditional audit of financial statements, similar disagreements are resolved
simply: the board’s judgments control. The auditor uses its opinion when planning the
scope of its audit—typically one of broader scope than if it concurred in the board’s
judgments. In an audit of internal control over financial reporting, however, additional
processes follow.

Section 11 of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a private right
of action for damages when a registration statement includes untrue
statements of material facts or fails to state material facts necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading. . . .[E]xperts such as
accountants who have prepared portions of the registration statement are
accorded a ‘due diligence’ defense. In effect, this is a negligence
standard. An expert may avoid civil liability with respect to the portions
of the registration statement for which he was responsible by showing that
‘after reasonable investigation’ he had ‘reasonable ground[s]’ to believe
that the statements for which he was responsible were true and there was
no omission of a material fact.
27

Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 56; see also Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E ¶ E69
(explaining PCAOB’s conclusion that the standard should explicitly acknowledge that the
board of directors is responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the audit committee
and that the auditor’s evaluation of the control environment is not intended to supplant
those evaluations).
28

Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 56; see also PCAOB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING AUDITING
STANDARD NO. 2, at 20-21 (explaining the same point).
29

Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 56.
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The auditor must come to an opinion on internal control over financial reporting.
If it concludes that these judgments amount to an ineffective audit committee, Auditing
Standard No. 2 instructs it to consider this, at minimum, a significant deficiency and
perhaps a material weakness.30 These requirements can constrain an auditor to issue an
adverse opinion on internal control over financial reporting. In this circumstance,
directors will feel pressure to submit to the auditor’s opinion rather than exercise their
own judgment.
2. Structural. — Under SOX § 301 and implementing measures of the SEC and
the SROs, listed company audit committees are directly responsible for appointing,
compensating, and overseeing the work of the company’s external auditors. This
investment of power in the audit committee presents a structural conflict with Auditing
Standard No. 2’s mandate that auditors evaluate audit committee effectiveness.
The body directly responsible for appointing and determining compensation of the
auditors, and overseeing their work, is subject, in turn, to that auditors’ scrutiny as part of
its audit of internal control over financial reporting. A committee so supervising an
auditor, charged with evaluating the committee, can be impaired in performing its duties;
an auditor charged with evaluating the committee’s effectiveness, in its supervisory and
other tasks, can be impaired in performing this evaluation and its other work.
The circular approach can violate the independence concept at the foundation of
auditing. Auditors are not independent if they act in a managerial capacity. A formal
assessment of audit committee effectiveness is a management role, a board responsibility.
30

Id., ¶¶ 59 & 140. Auditing Standard No. 2 defines the central concepts as follows:
A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination of
control deficiencies, that adversely affects the company’s ability to
initiate, authorize, record, process or report external financial data reliably
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such that
there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the
company’s annual or interim financial statements that is more than
inconsequential will not be prevented or detected.

Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 9.
A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or combination of
significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a
material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will
not be prevented or detected.
Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 10.
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Even when the evaluation is described as part of the auditor’s overall assessment of a
corporation’s control environment, this raises issues of independence impairment in fact
and in appearance. This violates longstanding principles of federal law expressed by the
Supreme Court, specific SEC rules, and voluminous professional auditing literature
defining generally accepted auditing standards.31
Not all such 360-degreee reviews are inherently suspect. Many managerial review
exercises at major corporations are conducted in precisely this manner. But given the
central function of auditors and audit committees in the financial reporting process, any
structures that may deter frank assessments should be resisted. Moreover, devices that
may tend to weaken an audit committee should be resisted. When auditors are vested
with implicit directive power over board audit committees, this dilutes a board’s similar
power, which may have the effect of diminishing an audit committee’s effectiveness.
If an auditor’s evaluation of audit committee effectiveness is memorialized in
audit opinions, moreover, consideration would be necessary concerning whether
management would also have to formally evaluate the audit committee. This multiplies
conflicts. A technical case can be made that when audit committees are part of an
auditors’ formal scope of review, they would likewise be within management’s formal
scope of review.32 If so, managers would become obligated to evaluate audit committees.
But audit committees are typically charged with evaluating management. So an additional
conflict arises where management is reviewing the audit committee and vice versa.
A more severe problem arises. If managers must evaluate the audit committee,
auditors will seek to rely on management’s evaluation in preparing their own evaluation
or reevaluation. This adds yet another circularity problem where auditors rely on
management. The result is a series of tangled circles studded with conflicts that risk
undermining the systemic utility of both auditors and audit committees.

31

See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RULE 2-01 OF REGULATION S-X, §
210.2-01 (“Rule 2-01 is designed to ensure that auditors are qualified and independent of
their audit clients both in fact and in appearance”) (emphasis added); see also
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: REVISION OF THE COMMISSION'S
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RULES, RELEASE NOS. 33-7919 & 34-43602, at notes 38-39
(citing numerous sources that emphasize requirement of the appearance of auditor
independence, including professional auditing literature and legal precedents like United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 n.15 (1984)).
32

The technical case would run as follows. Under Auditing Standard No. 2, an
ineffective audit committee is a significant deficiency. This in turn is a strong indicator
of a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting. In such cases,
management must review and address the issue to make its own internal control
assessment adequate. This would imply that management would have to review the audit
committee in order for the auditor to furnish an unqualified control audit opinion.
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PCAOB addresses these concerns obliquely. Its key structural response is to
emphasize that the auditor’s evaluation of the audit committee is “not a separate
evaluation” but part of evaluating the control environment and monitoring components of
internal control over financial reporting.33 It opined that this would partially address the
structural conflict and that the part unaddressed is simply inherent in professional
auditing.34
PCAOB’s release accompanying Auditing Standard No. 2 sought to minimize
conflict concerns. It opined that “Normally, the auditor’s interest and the audit
committee’s interests will be aligned” in pursuing fair financial statements and effective
control and auditing.35 It characterized the conflict between SOX § 301 and Auditing
Standard No. 2 as “theoretical.”36 PCAOB appealed to auditing custom and investor
knowledge, saying “experienced auditors are accustomed to bearing” such conflicts and
“that investors expect an auditor to address” them.37
Accordingly, PCAOB does not ultimately resolve the conflict, but says instead
that it is inevitable, auditors are used to operating with such conflicts, and investors are
okay with this. This result creates deep tension with fundamental concepts of auditor
independence and the heavy stress SEC regulations and SOX place on auditor
independence. Despite its efforts, PCAOB does not adequately respond to these
concerns. An additional or alternative mechanism that avoids these fundamental
problems thus remains appealing.
B. Expertise
Two additional concerns relate to whether auditors possess requisite expertise to
comply with Auditing Standard No. 2’s requirement that they evaluate audit committee
effectiveness as part of assessing the control environment. The first is whether auditors
possess necessary knowledge concerning the legal concept of independence, which
Auditing Standard No. 2 states auditors assess in this evaluation. The second involves
audit committee compliance with SOX, SEC and SRO requirements, which PCAOB’s
proposed standard required auditors to assess but which Auditing Standard No. 2 deletes.
The deletion solves one question and raises another: auditors are not directed to reach

33

Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E, ¶ E66.

34

Id. (explaining that emphasizing the context of the auditor’s evaluation would “address,
to some extent, the conflict-of-interest concerns” but that the conflict “is, to some extent,
inherent in the duties that society expects of auditors.”).
35

PCAOB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, at 21.

36

Id.

37

Id.
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legal conclusions concerning compliance, but are these conclusions in fact necessary to
form opinions concerning audit committee effectiveness?
1. Independence. — PCAOB’s proposed standard stated that auditors should
evaluate committee member independence, along with evaluating the independence of
their nomination, selection and action.38 Auditing Standard No. 2 retains a provision
concerning evaluating member independence, but deletes the latter more detailed
provisions without explanation. It likewise dropped without explanation a statement to
the effect that the more independent the nominating process, the more independent a
committee is likely to be.39
Identifying PCAOB’s reasons for the deletions requires speculation. Reasons
may include concerns that assessing the independence of a nomination or selection
process or of director action involves judgments concerning corporate governance and
law beyond an auditor’s expertise.40 SRO listing standards require boards to determine
the independence of each outside director, using specific criteria under those standards
supplemented by general principles rooted in state corporation law.41 Establishing links
between the independence of the nomination and selection process and member
independence is difficult. It is likewise a matter of corporate governance and legal
judgment. Determinations are made with reference to state corporation law, SOX § 301,
SEC regulations, and SRO listing standards, all likely beyond an auditor’s expertise.42
If the reason PCAOB deleted the supplemental requirements concerned expertise
and matters of law, it is difficult to justify retaining the factor calling for auditors to

38

Proposed Standard, ¶ 58.

39

Id.

Supporting this guess are some comment letters on PCAOB’s Proposed Standard,
including those provided by some auditing firms, as discussed in Part IV, infra.
40

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (Nov. 4, 2003);
NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, § 4350 (2003).
41

42

Another possible reason for the deletion is that SEC rules also require corporations to
disclose nominating committee processes. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
FINAL RULE: DISCLOSURE REGARDING NOMINATING COMMITTEE FUNCTIONS AND
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SECURITY HOLDERS AND BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, RELEASE
NOS. 33-8340 & 34-48825 (Nov. 24, 2003). However, if this justifies deleting
nomination-selection process independence from an auditing standard, it suggests
PCAOB serves as more than an auditing standard-setter. It is a component of an SECdirected regulatory regime combining various instruments including disclosure. See Part
V, infra.
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evaluate the “independence of the audit committee members from management.”43 This
is likewise a question of law and corporate governance, not auditing.
In fact, the appearance and use of this factor in Auditing Standard No. 2 are
driven entirely by legal rules. This is clear from the following note contained in Auditing
Standard No. 2, stating that companies whose securities are not listed:
may not be required to have independent directors for their audit
committees [and that] the auditor should not consider the lack of
independent directors at these companies indicative, by itself, of a control
deficiency.44
The purpose of the note is clear and accurate: when not required by listing
standards, absence of independent directors is not alone a control deficiency. The
negative implication is less clear and possibly wrong: when required by listing standards,
absence of directors is alone a control deficiency. Whether this negative implication is
correct is a legal question. The issue is whether an audit committee’s role and relative
effectiveness varies with exchange listings and related requirements. That, in turn,
depends on the purpose and meaning of the relevant requirements, including in this
context the independence concept. The purpose and meaning of legal concepts, including
the concept of director independence, are questions requiring legal analysis and
interpretation.
Relative to auditing, moreover, why should lack of independent directors indicate
a control deficiency? The foregoing note implies that the presence or absence of
independent directors is not relevant to internal control, much less to an auditor’s
assessment of audit committee effectiveness. Rather, for listed companies, the issue is
whether they are in compliance with listing standards, not whether that compliance
promotes committee effectiveness. The directive that auditors evaluate audit committee
member independence is therefore also fundamentally a matter of complying with those
listing standards imposing the requirement.
It is not possible to escape the fact that auditor evaluations of these characteristics
are therefore legal judgments, not auditing judgments.45 In any event, these challenges
indicate, again, that a search may be warranted to find alternative or additional providers
of audit committee evaluation and certification services.46
43

44

Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 57.
Id.

45

This view strengthens the suggestion noted above (in note 42) that PCAOB is operating
as a component in a complex web of federal regulation being directed by the SEC rather
than as an independent auditing standard setter. See Part V, infra.
Another inherent limit appears. When auditors render opinions concerning audit
committee effectiveness that involve legal expertise, they risk violating state laws
46
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2. Compliance. — Independent audit committee members are required by SRO
listing standards. While Auditing Standard No. 2 retains provisions directing auditors to
assess this factor, it deleted two other provisions expressly requiring auditors to evaluate
compliance with law and regulation, including SRO listing standards. The deleted
provisions directed auditors to assess audit committee compliance with the excruciatingly
detailed SRO listing standards under SOX § 301 and whether an audit committee
included a financial expert (called an audit committee financial expert or ACFE) as
contemplated under SOX § 407.47 Materials accompanying Auditing Standard No. 2
indicated three reasons for these deletions, as follows:
The factors that addressed compliance with listing standards and sections
of [SOX] were deleted, because those factors were specifically criticized
in comment letters as being either [1] outside the scope of the auditor’s
expertise or [2] outside the scope of internal control over financial
reporting [and PCAOB believed] that [3] those factors were not significant
to the type of evaluation the auditor was expected to make of the audit
committee.48
Explanation [1] is easy to accept; the other two raise additional issues.
Concerning the first explanation, consider that audit committees must comply
with various SRO listing standards and judge applicable best-practice guidelines
prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. Cf. Letter to PCAOB from BDO Seidman,
LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 136) (advising that when financial
statement preparers lack guidance for SOX § 404 compliance they turn to auditors and “It
is possible that auditors providing this guidance might be misconstrued as providing legal
advice . . . .”). Auditors doing so pursuant to Auditing Standard No. 2 generate an
additional bundle of clashes. Issues include the relationship between state law governing
the legal profession and prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law on the one hand and
the exact juridical status of PCAOB on the other. Compare Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 2
(noting that the standard summarizes legal requirements to provide context and
understanding, not to interpret them).
PCAOB Proposed Standard, ¶ 57. SOX § 301 directed the SEC to direct the SROs to
adopt various corporate governance standards as listing requirements, which the SROs
have done. Resulting listing standards, including for example the New York Stock
Exchange’s Section 303.A.00, specify such minutia as audit committees must have at
least three members and such procedures as audit committees having charters containing
specified details. SROs traditionally described their listed company manuals as
containing “listing standards,” accurate in the pre-federalization era and a misnomer now
that these manuals are laden with dense, excruciatingly-detailed provisions bearing no
resemblance to the concept of “standards.”

47

48

Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E, ¶ E68.
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established by SROs, the SEC and other engines of corporate governance. Whether a
committee complies with SRO listing standards is a legal judgment and whether a board
of directors opts to have its audit committee adhere to formally-articulated best practices
is a business judgment.
Consider again SOX’s provision concerning including an audit committee
financial expert (ACFE). Rules permit, but do not require, this feature and provide that a
board opting not to include an ACFE disclose reasons. Whether to include an ACFE is
essentially a matter of business judgment. Issues include whether that expertise is
necessary and whether relevant SEC standards are appropriate for the corporation.
Auditors are not in a position to assess this business judgment.
Rules requiring disclosing whether audit committees include an ACFE are
essentially legal rules. The remedy for failure to comply is delisting, and possibly other
sanctions. These are legal results posing business consequences. They are not elements
within the auditor’s purview, which is concerned ultimately with fair financial reporting
and indirectly with effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.
PCAOB’s second and third justifications for deleting compliance assessment
factors are more difficult to understand and interpret. If these are “outside the scope of
internal control over financial reporting” and “not significant” to the auditor’s evaluation,
why were they included in PCAOB’s proposed standard? A possible reason is that
PCAOB’s proposed standard envisioned an auditor evaluation that was “separate and
distinct” and encompassed review beyond effectiveness concerning internal control over
financial reporting. The review contemplated by Auditing Standard No. 2 is narrower.
This explanation may be satisfactory in terms of understanding and applying Auditing
Standard No. 2 as an auditing standard.
But PCAOB’s explanation is unclear. It bases its conclusion in part on comment
letters critical of the concept as either beyond an auditor’s expertise or outside the scope
of internal control over financial reporting; it separately states its opinion that these are
not significant to the auditor’s expected evaluation. It leaves unclear whether PCAOB
believes they are outside the scope of internal control over financial reporting and leaves
unexplained why they are not significant.49
Whatever weight one assigns to the relative significance of compliance as a
measure of audit committee effectiveness regarding internal control over financial
reporting, what is clear is that PCAOB is directing auditors not to treat this is a factor.
Whether auditors will do so or not is another question, since Auditing Standard No. 2’s
list of factors is not exhaustive. More importantly, if compliance is significant to audit
committee effectiveness, in terms of internal control over financial reporting or more
49

Opacity in PCAOB’s explanation suggests another possible account of its decision to
delete these items, echoing points noted above (in notes 42 and 45): that PCAOB is a
component of a broader federalized corporate governance regime managed by the SEC.
See Part V, infra.
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generally, this again suggests reasons to consider searching to identify additional or
alternative providers of audit committee evaluations.
C. Objective Criteria
Auditing Standard No. 2 mentions numerous other factors bearing on auditor
assessment of audit committee effectiveness in overseeing external financial reporting
and internal control over financial reporting. Most of these factors, as well as most audit
committee activities, are not measurable using objective criteria, a foundation of
traditional auditing standards. In fact, many are quite subjective.
One factor Auditing Standard No. 2 mentions is the clarity boards use in
articulating the audit committee’s responsibilities and how well managers and committee
members understand them.50 Measuring linguistic clarity is not easy; teachers measure
reading comprehension routinely and assign grades based on examinations. It is unclear
whether auditors possess objective tools such as examinations—and whether audit
committee members and managers would sit for them.51
Auditing Standard No. 2 states that auditors assess the audit committee’s
involvement and interaction with the external auditor. Apart from this metric’s
circularity and conflict-creation, measuring involvement and interaction is highly
subjective. PCAOB’s proposed standard spoke of the “level” of these factors, language
AS No.2 drops. Though “level” may be no more objectively measurable, at least it hinted
at some standard. Auditing Standard No. 2 also deletes illustrations appearing in
PCAOB’s proposed standard concerning involvement relating to the auditor’s retention,
appointment and compensation. No reason for the deletion is provided.
Auditing Standard No. 2 also states that auditors assess the audit committee’s
involvement and interaction with the internal audit team. The same criticism applies.
Auditing Standard No. 2 also dropped the proposed standard’s use of the word “level” in
this context. Similarly, it deletes illustrations appearing in PCAOB’s proposed standard
concerning involvement relating to the audit committee’s line of authority and role in
appointing and compensating internal auditors, also without explanation.
In Auditing Standard No. 2, PCOAB deleted a catch-all evaluation metric
appearing in its proposed standard: the amount of time a committee devotes to internal
50

Id. [“the clarity with which the audit committee’s responsibilities are articulated (for
example, in the audit committee’s charter) and how well the audit committee and
management understand those responsibilities.”].
51

No doubt many auditors excel in linguistic clarity and most of Auditing Standard No. 2
is written clearly, but consider the definition it provides for “significant deficiency,”
supra note 30 (quoting definition of significant deficiency from Auditing Standard No. 2,
¶ 9).
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control issues and the amount of time members “are able” to devote to committee
activity. It likewise does not explain why, perhaps because the metric so obviously
ignores quality of time. By definition, efficient committees spend little time with greater
effectiveness and inefficient committees spend more time with lesser effectiveness.
Auditing Standard No. 2 also adds factors not contained in PCAOB’s proposed
standard: (1) committee interaction with key members of financial management,
including the chief officers of finance and accounting; (2) the degree to which difficult
questions are raised and pursued with management and the auditor, including as to
critical accounting policies and judgmental accounting estimates; and (3) the committee’s
responsiveness to issues that an auditor raises. While likely probative of audit committee
effectiveness, none of these is measurable using objective criteria that are staples of
traditional auditing practice and assurance.
Despite many comment letters on PCAOB’s proposed standard criticizing the
absence of objective measurement criteria,52 Auditing Standard No. 2 does not come to
grips with the reality that these factors elude measurement by objective criteria. This
does not mean the factors or even subjective testing of them are unimportant or useless.
It suggests that traditional auditing tools are not well suited to conducting the evaluation.
D. Liability Risks
Finally, two issues arise concerning the liability effects of auditor evaluation of
audit committees. First, auditors evaluating audit committee effectiveness may expose
themselves to liability for violation of professional standards. Suppose an auditor
evaluates a corporation’s audit committee as effective. Subsequently a major financial
fraud is uncovered within the company. Auditors are likely defendants in lawsuits by
shareholders now armed with an additional liability theory.53 This auditor liability risk
may unduly raise the requirements auditors insist that audit committees meet before
drawing a favorable assessment. This bias would accentuate conflicts of interest.
Second, auditors evaluating audit committee effectiveness may expose audit
committee members to liability for violation of fiduciary obligations. Suppose an auditor
evaluates a corporation’s audit committee as ineffective. Whether or not fraud exists
within the corporation, shareholders are now armed with a theory of liability against
those directors.54 This audit committee liability risk may unduly lower the requirements
52

See Part IV, infra.

In a separate paper, I discuss and analyze liability risks that auditors face under
Auditing Standard No. 2. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Auditing’s New Early Warning
System: Theory, Practice and Auditor Liability Risk under PCAOB Auditing Standard
No. 2 (draft manuscript on file with the author and planned for release on
www.ssrn.com).
53

Director-liability risk is real for any Delaware corporation lacking charter provisions
exculpating directors from personal liability for money damages due to breaches of the
54
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auditors insist that audit committees meet before drawing a favorable assessment. This
bias cannot be counted on to offset the bias created by auditor liability risk. Taken
together, the conflicts again compound.
E. Summary of Limits and Gaps
To summarize the limits of auditor evaluation of audit committee effectiveness
shown by Auditing Standard No. 2:
● reports are not disclosed unless ineffectiveness constitutes a material weakness;
● evaluations are part of an overall control environment review related to internal
control over financial reporting, not a full-scale effectiveness evaluation;
● even this partial and non-public method poses conflicts with state corporation
law;
● it creates conflicts between auditors and audit committees;
● auditors must assess legal issues such as independence and cannot assess legal
issues such as compliance;
● auditors lack objectively measurable criteria; and
● liability risks of auditors and audit committees can impair optimal evaluation,
compounding conflicts.
Within these limits, auditors must nevertheless gain some level of assurance as to
audit committee effectiveness. Auditors attesting to the veracity of managerial assertions
concerning internal control over financial reporting, and to financial statement assertions,
require an understanding of audit committee effectiveness.
duty of care. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003) (authorizing such charter
provisions). For corporations governed by law based on the Model Business Corporation
Act the risk is less meaningful.
See ALI-ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
2.02(b)(4)(1990) (stronger version of the exculpation authorization, containing no
reservation for breaches of the duty of loyalty and the limitation concerning intentional
conduct lacks a good faith alternative). Even for Delaware corporations boasting such
charter provisions, director-liability risk is meaningful because charters do not exculpate
for breaches of the duty of loyalty or intentional conduct. Lack of independence required
by SROs as interpreted by auditors can indicate the former and disagreement with
auditors required to evaluate audit committee effectiveness could indicate the latter.
Risks include litigation uncertainty arising from judicial treatment of charter exculpations
as affirmative defenses, putting the burdens of pleading and proof on directors as to good
faith and absence of duty of loyalty breaches. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin. 787 A.2d
85 (Del. 2001).
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The issues are (1) whether the gap between what auditors can do and the ideal can
be filled using additional providers of audit committee effectiveness evaluations and/or
(2) whether alternative providers should be sought for the entire exercise, both to provide
assurance to financial statement users and for auditors to rely upon.55 Accordingly, it is
fruitful to consider other parties to supplement or substitute in this exercise to overcome
these inherent limits of auditor evaluations of audit committee effectiveness.

III. STATE AGENCIES
To recapitulate the framework of the evolving corporate governance regime: state
law provides that boards, including through audit committees, manage corporations; SOX
directs that audit committees oversee auditors, but otherwise imposes no substantive
duties on or regulatory oversight of audit committees; SROs provide disclosure rules
related to audit committee responsibilities and performance;56 PCAOB provides a partial,
limited and non-transparent auditor evaluation of audit committee effectiveness in
overseeing financial reporting and internal control over financial reporting.
In this evolving circle of corporate governance, one arc remains to be included: a
mechanism for a full, public audit committee evaluation by a party other than the board
of directors. While not obviously necessary,57 the arc is missing from the circle chiefly
due to federalism concerns: SOX and the other federal engines (SEC, SROs, PCAOB)
have not filled it. Congress could. For example, it could direct that audit committees be
evaluated and certified, perhaps by the SEC, PCAOB, or the United States General
Accounting Office (GAO).58
See Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶¶ 108-126 (expressly authorizing auditors to rely upon
the work of others in conducting audit when such other work is competent and objective).
55

SRO listing “standards” specify in excruciating detail how boards of directors are
obliged to supervise and evaluate audit committee performance, though the basic
standard is at heart a principle of state corporation law.
56

See Part I, supra. The issue recalls the famous exchange between Senator Alben
Barkley and the auditor Colonel Carter during hearings on the original federal securities
acts:
Senator Barkley: “You audit the controller?”
Mr. Carter: “Yes, the public accountant audits the controller’s account.”
Senator Barkley: “Who audits you?”
Mr. Carter: “Our conscience.”
See Gary John Previts & Barbara Dubis Merino, A History of Accountancy in the United
States: The Cultural Significance of Accounting (1998), at 457 n. 98.
57

A historical parallel supports both identifying and rejecting the GAO alternative: early
drafts of the federal securities laws from the 1930s provided that public company audits
would be performed by the GAO. In 1945, Congress established the Division of
58
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This is neither likely nor wise. It is unlikely because when Congress enacted
SOX, it expended its firepower, acted under the heated light of public fury, and through
the combination bought all related political rewards. It is unwise because though SOX
itself essentially merely codifies best practices, those charged with implementing its
provisions have so heavily extended the tentacles of corporate governance that more
federal hands on the scale would throw the system even further out of balance than the
gales following SOX so far have done.
Private suppliers could be tapped. A corporation could engage a separate external
auditing firm for this function. This would ameliorate conflicts, but not expertise
problems. Or a corporation could retain an outside law firm. This would solve expertise
problems. But lawyers’ interest in other work would pose conflict issues. Specialty firms
are unlikely to emerge as major sophisticated providers, given that the service would
likely produce low profit margins.
Higher-quality providers measured by higher
opportunity costs would likely not participate. For all three such alternative providers,
moreover, liability risks would be significant. Unless they priced their services at
premiums equivalent to functional insurers, this market would unlikely become vibrant or
useful to the public capital markets.59
Other candidates include rating agencies. They escape or neutralize some
problems but pose an additional significant issue. Certifications will appeal to
corporations when they lower their cost of capital (by an amount greater than the
agency’s fee). Rating agencies provide a service that strongly influences the cost of
capital. Accordingly, selling these services to rated clients poses a conflict. Involving
rating agencies in internal evaluations of audit committees could also impair the rating
agency’s objectivity and independence when providing credit rating services. Finally, the
fact that rating agencies have not emerged to offer this service suggests a low likelihood
that they will do so.
A. Inherent Appeal, and Some Limits
States can fill the gap. This section outlines how a state agency would overcome
or neutralize all of the inherent limits associated with an auditor evaluation of audit
committee effectiveness. Highlights include: it would be public in terms of disclosure,
complete, conflict-free, assess legal and compliance issues, be performed using criteria
Corporate Audits within the GAO and mandated that it audit all government
corporations. Resulting laws dramatically increased the GAO’s workload. The GAO
continues to play an important watchdog function over public company auditors. See
Previts & Merino, A History of Accountancy in the United States, supra note 57, at 33031, 403 & 410.
59

For the case supporting using insurance markets to address financial fraud risks, see
Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J. L. & BUS. 39, 48-61 (2002).
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with which relevant experts are familiar, and eliminate liability risks posed by auditor
evaluations. The following explains each point.
The first two advantages are nearly self-evident. First, state agencies could
provide public evaluations of audit committee effectiveness. Corporations could disclose
the certifications as part of their public securities filings. Second, the service could
examine overall committee effectiveness, not just concerning areas related to external
financial reporting and internal control over financial reporting.
States may be superior to auditors and other private actors because they are free of
conflicts these face. Limiting conflicts is inherent in the concept of a state-chartered
agency conducting the certification exercise. Both conflicts Auditing Standard No. 2
poses are neutralized: there is no conflict between the state and its corporation law and no
conflict between a state agency and boards of directors, audit committees, corporate
management or auditors. This would diminish the circumstances in which disagreements
arise, limiting them to situations in which major concerns about effectiveness exist, not
quarrels over business or legal judgments.60
An equally significant advantage is that states have at their disposal the expertise
and requisite criteria to apply. Experts in state corporation law would draw on the
reservoir of fiduciary concepts. These require independence (a duty of loyalty concept)
and competence, including a measure of financial expertise (duty of care concepts). They
encompass the particulars specified in SEC and SRO rules emanating from these bedrock
concepts, as well as compliance with law.
Critics hold different interpretations concerning the teeth of modern fiduciary
duty law, especially as articulated and applied by the Delaware Supreme Court.61
Traditional fiduciary duty law had teeth. Current state law applications may be seen as
lax. State agency affirmations of audit committee effectiveness based on adherence to
weak state law principles would not mean very much.
These points suggest possible virtues of a state-agency approach to audit
committee evaluations. Certification could help reinvigorate traditional fiduciary
Conflicts could arise depending on how the state agency were funded, a point discussed
in the next section.

60

As one example among many split views on Delaware Supreme Court opinions,
consider continuing critical appraisals of its landmark decision holding directors
personally liable for breach of the duty of care in Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985): some call it a “legal disaster” while others champion it as the “apogee” of
judicial excellence. Compare, e.g., Fred S. McCheseny, A Bird in the Hand and Liability
in the Bush: Why Van Gorkum Still Rankles, Probably, 96 NW. L. REV. 631 (2002) with
Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkum’s Legacy: The Limits of
Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of Proprietary Incentives, 96 NW. L.
REV. 579 (2002).
61
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obligation. If so, state agencies reviewing the relationship of their laws to audit
committee effectiveness could facilitate development of state law more congruent with
standards necessary to make audit committees effective. This could not only invigorate
competition among states for optimal governance arrangements, but an internal
competition within states towards the same end.62 In addition, state corporation law’s
fiduciary obligations, including independence and competence (loyalty and care), are
standards-based. This provides an attractive alternative to the dense rule-bound approach
that invariably emanates from federal sources, including SROs, as well as from
accounting and auditing standard setters, including PCAOB.63
A major upside to a state agency approach to audit committee evaluation is
liability risk limitation. State agencies attesting to audit committee effectiveness can be
designed to enjoy the benefits of sovereign immunity, for both the agency and its
employees. An agency’s certification would not expose it to liability in the event of
subsequent financial frauds at the corporation. The result is to eliminate liability risks
from the tasks of the agency and the audit committee.
Nor should agency certifications carry any legal significance in subsequent
litigation concerning a company, its board of directors, audit committee or shareholders.
Positive certifications should not be available to insulate boards or committees from
liability and negative certifications should not provide a basis to support shareholder
claims of director breach of fiduciary duty or other liability. In each case, however,
courts could admit related evidence when deemed appropriate under judicial notice
concepts.64 These provisions would likewise eliminate liability risks from the tasks of the
agency and the audit committee.
A final advantage to the state agency approach is that the agency could also
experiment with a variety of designations. These can include a pass-fail assessment to
more refined gradations. A refined scale would offer more valuable information to the
user community and provide superior feedback to audit committees on their
effectiveness.65
Probabilities here depend on which of several rival theories of corporation law
production one holds, discussed in Part V, infra.
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See Chandler & Strine, The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance
System, supra note 4; see also supra note 47.
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So using judicial notice concepts would enable judges to draw upon knowledge
developed by the state agency as to what constitutes effective audit committees. This
could enhance the quality of fiduciary duty law judges articulate, without turning the
device itself into a liability-determining mechanism.
64

65

PCAOB expresses a more modest goal, necessary by virtue of inherent limits on what
auditors can do in the exercise. See Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E, ¶ E67 (the goal is
not to “grade the effectiveness of the audit committee along a scale” but to detect any
audit committee ineffectiveness for purposes of the auditor’s overall control evaluation).
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The advantage of a graded scale, on the other hand, implicates complex
measurement challenges. State agencies interested in providing graded evaluations
would need to develop adequate criteria by which to provide them. This raises a related
and broader question they would need to answer: what constitutes audit committee
effectiveness. This can vary with contexts, corporations and committees. Officials would
need to recognize this informed by an appreciation of fiduciary law principles embracing
this reality.66 Officials would also need to understand that the audit committee is an
element of the overall corporate governance system of which board-effectiveness is
likewise a key element. Evaluating and certifying this broad functionality may be
difficult.
Finally, there may be areas where auditors are in a better position than state
agency officials to evaluate aspects of audit committee effectiveness. These may relate to
technical aspects concerning internal control over financial reporting. State agency
officials would need to develop an understanding of these areas or themselves rely upon
auditors for assistance in their evaluation. Whether one or the other of such evaluations
is adequate would require investigation; if each contributes unique expertise both may be
necessary and each would rely upon the other to complete respective assignments.67
Advantages to the state agency approach remain in affording this additional assurance
auditors cannot provide.
B. Implementation
From the states’ viewpoint, a key attraction of a state-agency audit committee
evaluation program is to create and/or leverage a brand name. Whether one agrees or
disagrees with the structure and content of state corporation law or particular cases, states
command legal expertise, especially as to concepts of independence, loyalty, competence
and governance. Delaware has a brand name that attracts corporate chartering business to
the state; Nevada appears interested in creating one; the larger states with more in-state
corporations and a rich corporate law tradition also boast a brand name in the corporate
world, including California and New York.
States adopting the concept would signal interest in developing the gold standard
in corporate governance. The signal is superior to any similar signals the judiciary could
offer through enhanced fiduciary enforcement, for example, since judges only resolve
cases and controversies after-the-fact, not general corporate governance matters ex ante.
Exploiting this opportunity by creating a state agency to provide audit committee

For “ten rules for really effective audit committees” offered by a corporate lawyer, see
John F. Olson, How to Make Audit Committees More Effective, 54 BUS. LAW. 1097,
1106-12 (1999).
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Cf. Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶¶ 108-126 (expressly authorizing auditors to rely upon
the work of others in conducting audit when such other work is competent and objective).
67

27

evaluations and certifications entails facing design and administration issues, the outlines
of which are sketched as follows.
Organization and Authorization. The agency could be created as part of an
existing arm of state government or a newly-created agency.68 It could be part of the
executive or legislative branches of state government, but should be separate from the
judicial branches (to protect against the use of agency certifications in subsequent
litigation). To enjoy sovereign immunity, the agency should be created as part of the
state, rather than any political sub-division. The agency could be created either by act of
the governor or through particular legislation.69 Ideally, the agency would be designed to
maximize insulation from political pressures.
Staffing and Training. Relevant experts within a state include active and retired
lawyers, judges and academics. These experts could be appointed to the agency in the
same manner as other state officials or judges. Or alternative appointment mechanisms
could be devised, such as the governor appointing officials directly with or without
approval of the state legislature. Some experts may opt for this role rather than going on
the bench. Limited additional training would be necessary (as to internal control over
financial reporting perhaps), though members would undoubtedly continue to maintain
their expertise through formal and informal educational pursuits such as reading relevant
literature and attending relevant conferences. States could also experiment with
outsourcing portions of the exercises using professional organizations that match experts
with assignments.70
Certifications and Designations. Corporation codes could be amended to require
or make optional a periodic audit committee evaluation and public certification. A range
of certifications could result depending on the scope of the related evaluation, from
simple compliance to overall effectiveness. Corporations could disclose the certifications
in any forum they wished, including as part of their public securities filings.
Optional Approach Suggested. Whether to make it optional or mandatory requires
deliberation. While this choice should be left to individual states, there is a strong case
68

In Delaware, this task could be assigned to the existing Division of Corporations within
the Department of State, or a newly-created corporations auditing office.
In Delaware, the process of amending the state corporation law is straightforward,
managed virtually entirely by the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar
Association. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885 (1990).
69

E.g., GEMinfo.org & Round Table Group (www.roundtablegroup.com). This approach
may be valuable to address the start-up costs associated with developing new agencies. It
would also provide resources to the state agency when demand for services periodically
spikes, as it may at the program’s outset and during periods of unusually high investor
anxiety.
70
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for the optional approach given absence of a compelling systemic need for the
certification.71 If optional, corporations would decide on frequency; if mandatory, states
would specify whether it should be done annually, bi-annually, tri-annually, or perhaps at
different frequencies for corporations of different size, complexity and financial-reporting
track records.72 If made optional, two categories of domestic corporations could be
designated, one for those opting in and one for those opting out. In Delaware, for
example, corporations could describe themselves as a “Delaware corporation” for those
opting out; and a “certified Delaware corporation” for those opting in.
Extending to Out-of-State Corporations. States could offer this service for
locally-chartered corporations and could even offer it for corporations chartered
elsewhere. So extending the service offers the advantage of enhancing competition
among states, with the partial disadvantage of requiring experts in one state’s corporation
law to become expert in another (there is so little variation across states that this should
be of limited significance). If offering the service to out-of-state corporations, these
could be authorized to use the designation in a similar way to in-state corporations. A
California corporation opting for the Delaware certification, for example, could describe
itself as a “Delaware-certified California corporation.”73
Self-Funding. The agency could generate funds from those corporations using its
certification service. Pricing of services could be proportional to SOX’s public company
accounting support fee, given work required and information being generated and
conveyed. It would certainly be a small fraction of those fees and likewise a small
fraction of ongoing audit costs (especially now that they have risen significantly).74
Pricing could be in part a function of the agency’s expenses. The largest agency expenses
would likely be for salaries and office space. Travel expenses could be charged to
corporations using the service.
71

See Part I, supra.

Unlike the SEC or SROs, states also could offer this product to all corporations, not
just those with registered and/or listed securities. Appeal for widespread use is suggested
by proliferation of SOX-type governance practices among various non-SEC registrants (a
phenomenon known as “Sarbinization”). E.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability,
WWW.SSRN.COM (March 11, 2004).
72

Some may find such designations confusing, at first. But nearly all complex novelties
are confusing, at first. E.g., ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970).
73

74

See FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE SURVEY ON SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404
IMPLEMENTATION (Jan. 2004) [survey of 321 companies of various sizes shows that
under SOX (a) on average annual costs rise $1,322,200 ($590,100 for internal control
audits and $732,100 for new systems) and (b) for companies with revenues exceeding $5
billion, average annual costs rise $6.2 million ($4.7 million for new internal control
audits, $1.5 million for new systems)].
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Supplemental Budgets. The agency need not be self-sustaining from service fees
it generates. A portion of the state budget funded by corporation franchise fees could be
allocated to underwrite the agency’s budget. This would be a prudent budgetary measure
to the extent the certification becomes a signal of a states’ interest in the most effective
audit committees and corporate governance generally. States offering the service to
domestic and foreign corporations could offer a discount for domestic corporations, a
device to lure additional chartering business to the state and offset such supplemental
budgeting.
Funding Conflicts. A potential conflict arises when corporations pay a state to
provide this service, however, on grounds of regulatory capture. There is no complete
way around such conflicts. A way to minimize it in this context is to provide
shareholders a voice in making the decision whether to use the service. After all, the
service would be primarily for their benefit. Alternative tools to facilitate shareholder
voice on the subject include state law voting mechanisms such as charter opt-ins or optouts and/or federal proxy mechanisms providing for more pro-active shareholder
proposals on the subject.
Other Factors. This is not an exhaustive catalogue of relevant features of a state
agency audit committee evaluation function. It outlines key features. States would be
entitled and encouraged to experiment with variations on these and other features. The
possibility of variations on these themes and particular models would induce competition
among the states. Corporations, acting through their boards of directors and audit
committees, would consider which programs, if any, offer the best product in terms of
signaling credibility to the market and towards minimizing the corporation’s cost of
capital. 75

IV. ANTICIPATING SUPPORTING CONSENSUS FROM THE FIELD
Comments offered publicly on PCAOB’s Proposed Standard provide a strong
basis for inferring that the state-agency approach would garner substantial support from a
wide variety of constituencies, including users, producers and professionals.76
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For data on the relationship between certain corporate governance features and
ratings—and hence the cost of capital—see Hollis S. Ashbaugh, Daniel W. Collins &
Ryan Z. Lafond, The Effects of Corporate Governance on Firms’ Credit Ratings,
SSRN.com (March 2004). The researchers find that credit ratings are unaffected by audit
committee member independence, are positively related to board independence and
negatively related to CEO power over the board. Audit committee certifications would
provide more refined information to rate credit quality and possibly improve credit
ratings and reduce the cost of capital.
PCAOB recorded 194 comment letters on its proposed standard leading to Auditing
Standard No. 2, all available using PCAOB’s Web site, www.pcaobus.org (click
76
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A. Users and Producers
Several comments on behalf of investors and other financial statement users
supported PCAOB’s proposed standard in concept, though recognizing the difficulty
auditors face in discharging the assignment.77 They emphasized the need for an
independent review, which excludes auditors. Suggestions included that boards of
directors hire specialists from another CPA firm or from a non-CPA firm.78
Not all investor groups supported PCAOB’s Proposed Standard.79 The California
State Teachers’ Retirement System emphasized conflicts, limited auditor competencies
and existing sources of supervision and information. Even it, however, concluded by
suggesting that “PCAOB may want to review the charters and opine on the audit
committee’s diligence in mitigating risks to the public.” 80
A residual user concern focused on the importance of auditors understanding
audit committee effectiveness. Absent such testing, one said, it would be “wrong and
misleading to investors” for an auditor to report that it has assessed effectiveness of
internal control over financial reporting without assessing the audit committee.81 This
can be solved, however, by providing an independent and competent review upon which
auditors can rely.

Rulemaking to link to PCAOB Docket, number 8). Aside from a handful of polemical
screeds, the letters are thoughtful analyses providing numerous perspectives, some 60 of
which are cited in the following discussion by letter number in the PCAOB docket.
These included the Commonwealth of Virginia; CalPERS; the AFL-CIO; Ohio
Retirement Systems; and Glass, Lewis & Co.
77

78

Despite these qualifications, PCAOB asserted in explanations accompanying Auditing
Standard No. 2 that “investors supported the provision.” Auditing Standard No. 2, App.
E, ¶ E63.
79

This is contrary to PCAOB’s assertion in explanations accompanying Auditing
Standard No. 2 that “investors supported the provision.” Id.
Comment Letter to PCAOB from California State Teachers’ Retirement System
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 58).
80

81

Comment Letter to PCAOB from Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 184). Glass Lewis is an independent proxy and financial
research firm that provides research to institutional investors. Id. Its letter is signed by
Lynn E. Turner, former SEC Chief Accountant.
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Issuer comment letters nearly unanimously recognized the need for effective audit
committees, while generally opposing having auditors perform the evaluation.82 Only a
few issuer comment letters supported using the auditor to perform this task, noting
conflicts.83 Another hinted at the state agency possibility: that the evaluation be done “on
a periodic basis by a party other than the external auditor.”84
The vast majority of issuers opposing PCAOB’s proposed standard’s auditor
evaluation of the audit committee cited SOX § 301 as conflicting with Auditing Standard
No. 285 (some of these also cited conflicts with SRO rules requiring boards to conduct
82

Collective expressions of corporate America’s opinions sounded themes similar to
those particular corporations offered and summarized here. E.g., Comment Letter to
PCAOB from Business Roundtable (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 181)
(concept is “particularly inappropriate” given SOX § 301 and SRO listing standards).
Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of corporations with a
combined work-force of more than 10 million US employees and $3.7 trillion in annual
revenues. Id.
83

Comment Letters to PCAOB from United Technologies Corporation (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 46); Chittendon Corp. (PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 34); Kimball International (PCAOB Letter Nos. 2 & 38); and
Crowe Chizek and Company, LLC (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 168).
84

Comment Letter to PCAOB from Texas Instruments Incorporated (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 114).
85

E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from BP plc (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8,
Letter No. 47); Pfizer Inc. (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 69); Eli Lily
and Company (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 75); Boise Cascade
Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 81); Commercial Federal
Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 87); Empire District
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 97); Southern Union Company (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 98); EnCana Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 111); Texas Instruments Incorporated (PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 114); E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 115); Edison Electric Institute (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 117); Cummins Inc. (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket
No. 8, Letter No. 123); Irwin Financial Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8,
Letter No. 125); EMS companies (Solecdtron, Flextronics, Celestica and Sanmina-SCI)
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 130); Sun Life Financial Inc. (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 134); Jefferson Wells International (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 135); Bank of America (PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 145); Computer Sciences Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 151); Motorola, Inc. (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter
No. 154); and BellSouth Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No.
162).
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audit committee evaluations).86 Many emphasized that audit committee effectiveness is a
board of directors’ responsibility,87 questioned whether auditors possess requisite
expertise, and noted that SROs are addressing the subject. Issuer comment letters that
suggested tying the need to the board of directors returns the question to state doorsteps.
On balance, therefore, the issuer community would likely support the state agency
concept. If made optional, some would likely opt for it.
Few directors offered comments on PCAOB’s proposed standard; those
commenting said little concerning specifics of auditor evaluation of audit committee
effectiveness. In general, however, one could expect directors to prefer a state agency
approach rooted in common law principles. There is nothing new in these concepts.
They are also standards-based and include the business judgment rule. This contrasts with
the auditor’s professional skepticism that would lead to second-guessing and PCAOB’s
heavily rule-based approach that suffocates business judgment.88 While not possible to
predict every director’s opinion, it seems reasonable to expect that a critical mass would
support it.89
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E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from Commercial Federal Corporation (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 87); E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 115); and Bank of America (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 145).
87

E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 62); EnCana Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 111); and Yellow Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket
No. 8, Letter No. 146).
88

Numerous comment letters criticized PCAOB proposal as exceedingly dense and
rule-bound. E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from Association of the Bar of the City of
New York (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 68) (“overly rigid, technical
rules,” and encouraging “more principles-based and less rigid” approach); Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter
No. 102) (“gives the impression of trying to achieve, and having an overall expectation
of, ‘perfection’”, and evincing a “stifling bureaucracy”); Irwin Financial Corporation
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 125) (“overly prescriptive and rigid”);
ATT Corp. (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 85) (“overly prescriptive”);
Boise Cascade Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 81) (“too
prescriptive and detailed”); Manufacturers’ Alliance/MAPI (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket
No. 8, Letter No. 99) (“Unnecessarily prescriptive”); and Prof. Dennis R. Beresford
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 21) (“overkill”).
89

Comments from consultants to boards furnish support. One proposed to overcome
inherent limitations of auditor evaluations by suggesting that audit committee evaluation
be done by a “third party approved by shareholders, in a separate evaluation. Comment
Letter to PCAOB from Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 127).
33

B. The Auditing Profession
Auditing’s Big Four firms90 generally opposed PCAOB’s proposed standard
requiring auditor evaluations of audit committees, but not because it lacks a certain
appeal.91 Deloitte and PWC sympathized, in principle, but held deep reservations as to
implementation; KPMG and E&Y made the practical objections more explicit. All
accepted that audit committee effectiveness is an important component of the control
environment, but only a component and therefore not warranting separate auditor
evaluation. PWC emphasized that the board of directors is responsible for audit
committee effectiveness; E&Y observed that internal control should function without
audit committee involvement; and Deloitte recognized that many see the audit committee
as outside the scope of internal control over financial reporting.
Deloitte and KPMG both expressed concern about evaluation capabilities given
that auditors lack full, complete, unfettered access to audit committee members, meetings
and information. E&Y identified the following areas where it believes auditors are
capable of evaluation using objective criteria: clarity of responsibility articulation;
assessing the committee’s management approach to designing, implementing, and
monitoring internal control over financial reporting; and whether it reacts to
management’s failure to respond to deficiencies. KMPG disagreed concerning whether
auditors have these and other capabilities, noting in particular that it is not clear how
auditors would assess member understanding of duties or the significance of time
devoted.
All the Big Four singled out areas clearly beyond their capabilities or competence.
Leading this list are those involving legal determinations like independence and listing
standard compliance. Deloitte characterized testing compliance with listing standards
under SOX § 301 as testing for compliance with laws/regulations, outside the scope of
internal control over financial reporting. It also indicated the lack of auditor capability in
evaluating whether the audit committee nominating process was independent. KPMG
opined that compliance with listing standards under SOX § 301 or concerning ACFE

90

The firms and the number of their letters in PCAOB’s comment-letter docket are
Deloitte & Touche LLP (71); Ernst & Young LLP (E&Y) (144); KPMG LLP (91); and
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC) (82).
91

This view is contrary to PCAOB’s assertion in explanations accompanying Auditing
Standard No. 2 that auditors “were generally supportive” although they sought clarity that
the evaluation was “not a separate and distinct evaluation” but “one element” of the
auditor’s overall understanding and that auditors would have difficulty given lack of total
access. Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E, ¶ E64.
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under SOX § 407 are legal interpretations and regulatory compliance outside the scope of
reliable financial reporting.92
Auditing’s three mid-sized firms93 offered opinions similar to the Big Four. BDO
Seidman also emphasized that because corporate governance—not just the audit
committee—is a critical component of the control environment, board effectiveness is
critical. It also cautioned against having auditors provide implicit assurance on audit
committee effectiveness.94 Grant Thornton added that effective audit committees are not
necessary to effective internal control over financial reporting and effective oversight is
not sufficient for effective internal control over financial reporting. McGladrey & Pullen
expressed greater optimism, opining that legal compliance matters aside, auditors possess
objectivity and technical competence to judge audit committee effectiveness, but wanted
the duty limited to “consideration of observable information and behavior.”
The AICPA substantially replicated comments of the Big Four.95 An Illinois
group was divided, though even supporters noted that auditors face a “difficult task” in
evaluation, including as to legal and regulatory compliance.96 A Texas group favored it,
admitting that the audit committee’s power over the auditor may deter objective
assessment, but noting that ineffective audit committees can cause significant problems.97
A New York group noted conflicts and competency issues, but again paving the way
toward a state approach concluded that this task should be performed by the board of
92

Deloitte and KPMG both suggested that if the concept is retained, then management’s
report would also need to assess audit committee effectiveness. Deloitte cited for support
SOX § 407’s requirement that boards determine whether to have an ACFE and listing
standards that require boards to perform annual audit committee assessments. KPMG
concurred (as did the mid-sized auditing firm, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP), adding that
auditors should be permitted to rely upon management’s assessment in preparing their
own evaluation. The Big Four also all agreed that the listed factors need refinement.
93

The firms and the number of their letters in PCAOB’s comment-letter docket are BDO
Seidman, LLP (136); Grant Thornton LLP (101); and McGladrey & Pullen, LLP (142).
94

BDO Seidman was the only major accounting firm to cite SOX § 301’s directive as
driving a conflict between the audit committee and the auditor and hindering
communication, the dominant points offered by nearly every issuer comment letter and
many others. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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Comment Letter to PCAOB from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 105).
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Comment Letter to PCAOB from Audit and Assurance Services Committee of the
Illinois CPA Society (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 103).

Comment Letter to PCAOB from Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 78).
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directors, the SEC or “some other body that is not in the employ of the audit
committee.”98 One professional auditors’ group believed the proposal is appropriate, but
required more guidance;99 another took the opposite position, urging its deletion.100 The
latter cited the litany of factors posing inherent limits, all of which would be neutralized
by the state agency concept.
International associations of accountants expressed reservations, drawing on
learning that likewise points towards a state solution. The largest group of international
accountants observed that it is a difficult question: in theory, auditors cannot perform this
task; in practice, someone must perform it; and on balance, the optimal solution is to
require auditors to perform an evaluation linked narrowly to their assessment of the
overall control environment.101 A UK accountancy group noted that the UK Combined
Code on Corporate Governance requires boards to conduct performance evaluations of
audit committees.102 A European group emphasized the need to address the conflict, not
shrink from it, suggesting using a threats-safeguards approach similar to that of the IFAC
Ethics Code which would involve requesting an “independent colleague (review partner)
to assist.”103
Among accounting academics, the leading group, the American Accounting
Association (AAA), opined: “one radical and perhaps cost-prohibitive suggestion is to
require a second audit firm to perform the audit committee assessment on a less frequent
basis (e.g., every 3-5 years).” As noted at the beginning of this Part, this would solve the
problem of independence, but not of expertise. It indicates, however, a willingness that
should lead the AAA to support the state agency approach—a willingness likewise

Comment Letter to PCAOB from New York State Society of Certified Public
Accountants (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 140).
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Comment Letter to PCAOB from National State Auditors Association (PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 113).
100

Comment Letter to PCAOB from Institute of Internal Auditors (PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 112).
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Comment Letter to PCAOB from Association of Chartered Certified Accountants
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 88). The Association of Chartered
Certified Accountants boasts that it is the world’s largest professional association of
accountants. Id.
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Comment Letter to PCAOB from Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 102).
103

Comment Letter to PCAOB from Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 79).
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strongly indicated by substantially all the other comment letters the auditing profession
provided to the PCAOB on its proposed standard, as summarized above.
C. The Legal Profession
The American Bar Association (ABA) concluded that PCAOB’s proposed
standard was “not consistent with” SOX § 301104 and “appear[ed] flawed and circular.”
Beyond these general fatal flaws, the ABA identified three more negotiable flaws: many
requirements are beyond an auditor’s expertise or are better handled by others; are not
measurable by objective criteria; or require legal judgments.
The Association of the Bar of the City New York reported similar objections to
PCAOB’s proposed standard, and also objected on the grounds that the listed evaluation
factors “would require a much greater degree of involvement by the auditors in the
internal operation of the audit committee” and observation requiring skills beyond auditor
expertise, including knowledge of listing standards and interpretations.105 The New York
State Bar Association expressed similar concerns, citing both independence-impairment
when auditors perform this essentially managerial function and questioned whether
auditors are in a good position to carry out the duties.106
No other bar association commented on PCAOB’s proposed standard, though an
informed guess suggests that most would concur with the views expressed by the ABA
and the two New York associations. On the other hand, certain bar associations might
have more specific concerns, including for example the Delaware State Bar Association,
whose expertise in corporation law and corporate governance may equip and incline it to
provide more detailed insights. In any event, if the comments these bar associations
provided are representative, it is reasonable to infer that the legal profession as a body
would support the state agency concept.
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Comment Letter to PCAOB from American Bar Association, Section of Business Law
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 185).
105

Comment Letter to PCAOB from Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Committee on Financial Reporting (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 68).
106

Comment Letter to PCAOB from New York State Bar Association, Business Law
Section, Committee on Securities Regulation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter
No. 180). The American Society of Corporate Secretaries echoed the points, also
emphasizing how the SROs are addressing the questions. Comment Letter to PCAOB
from American Society of Corporate Secretaries, PCAOB Sub-Committee of the ASCS
Securities Law Committee (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 106).
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V. ANTICIPATING REGULATORY HESITATION
Despite predicting likely support for the state agency concept from users and
preparers of financial statements and from the auditing and legal professions, it is
uncertain whether regulators or states would support it. These predictions can be
informed by evaluating the overall prevailing framework of corporate governance and
alternative models of how its components are produced. The current array is dominantly
federal, with states residing in the background, a relationship that tends to support
predicting federal regulatory hesitation and state reluctance or indifference. But there
may be hope.
A. Federal
Generations of corporate law scholars have debated whether state corporation law
is a product of horizontal competition among the states and, if so, whether the
competitive output showed a race to the top, to the bottom or to somewhere else.107 As
the intellectual and empirical debate stalemates on this horizontal competition among
states, an alternative sees a vertical competition between federal securities regulation and
state corporate law, with the federal hand dominant but still limited.108 In this story,
SROs either (a) fill a gap between federal and state corporate governance sources or (b)
operate as an extension of the federal regulatory hand into territory better reached
through superficially-private means or where federal courts would not allow federal
administrative agencies to venture.109
Recent debates concerning SROs resemble the hoary corporate law debate in
asking whether competition among SROs, plus foreign securities exchanges, are running

Debate dates to the 1930s, led by Justice Brandeis and Professors Berle and Means,
continued through the 1970s in a noted exchange between SEC Chairman Cary and Judge
Winter, and endured through the 1990s and today with scores of articles devoted to
numerous aspects of the subject. For representative positions, see ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW (1993) (top); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992) (bottom); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (lawyer and investment banker interest groups); William W.
Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L. REV. 401
(1994).
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E.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 488 (2003); Jones,
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a horizontal race of their own, and whether this is to the top or bottom.110 Similar debate
concerns competition among other regulatory bodies, such as accounting standard-setters
like the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) versus the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
With PCAOB’s creation a similar conversation is likely concerning its obvious
competitors such as the International Auditing Standards Board. To the extent PCAOB
also engages in standard-setting that affects corporate governance, however, a new
conception of horizontal competition emerges: PCAOB can compete with states and
SROs. PCAOB’s product market is less clear than Delaware’s (charters for franchise
fees) or the SROs (listings for listing fees). But power to set the agenda and to control
the processes of standard-setting may be intrinsically valuable, and despite SOX’s effort
to insulate PCAOB from the auditing profession, rents may remain available that PCAOB
could have a major role in allocating.111
In the case of evaluating audit committees, which body should set the agenda and
specify required elements: the SEC, SROs, PCAOB or states? The SEC may fear direct
efforts to do this would extend beyond the power Congress granted it in SOX (or, more
precisely, that a federal court might accept this argument);112 it may recognize that using
SROs would be impracticable given their distance from the operational activities of audit
committees; by default or design, PCAOB fills the bill.
Some evidence from the evolution of PCAOB’s proposed standard into Auditing
Standard No. 2 suggests that PCAOB is operating as a component of a more general
federal-based corporate governance system.113 Whether the SEC would want the states to
do this is unclear. Some evidence suggests that federal regulators disfavor competition
among SROs;114 if so, they may likewise object to horizontal competition by states
against these SEC instrumentalities.
Indulging a naïve perspective, however, if federal regulators were acting in the
best interests of the nation, they would welcome the state agency approach to audit
committee certification as well. Congress, the SEC and the SROs exhibited some
federalism restraint in their provisions concerning audit committees: all reposed
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substantial power in boards to review effectiveness and imposed disclosure requirements.
PCAOB offers enhanced review by auditors, but is clearly aware of inherent limitations.
None of these groups offers the solution best suited to the task.
Returning to federal regulators’ self-interest, assigning this function to states
would relieve these regulators of the particular associated burdens, while leaving them in
a position to monitor the concept in action. The SEC operates using a restricted budget,
after all, and must appeal to Congress to secure funding for its activities. When facing
budget constraints, the SEC may prefer additional funds to support its enforcement
activities rather than to develop or support new initiatives such as audit committee
certification.
Permitting states a meaningful role in corporate governance offers the SEC
another advantage. When systems fail and public protests ensue, federal regulators can
point to the states for laxity in fiduciary standards or other weaknesses. The states are
thus also useful to Congress as scapegoats for scandal. So Congress may be willing to
encourage the SEC to support a state-agency approach to audit committee certifications.
In fact, this view may explain what are otherwise SOX’s half-measures. That is,
why not preempt state corporation law for public companies, subjecting directors and
audit committees to federal corporation law standards and review? Though complex
political and legal explanations arise, a simple and plausible explanation is this: maybe
the half-steps reflect knowledge that no regulatory regime is capable of preventing
fraudulent shenanigans and regulatory laxity like that of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Leaving the state hole enables the federal apparatus to point to state laxity when
the next wave of corporate malfeasance is revealed. If federalization of corporate
governance were made complete today, then when the next scandal appears there would
be no one but the federal apparatus to blame. Under this view, states as a whole have an
incentive to participate in reshaping corporate governance with the same visibility and
commitment the federal engines have exhibited. Whether individual states have requisite
incentives is considered next.
B. States
Estimating the likelihood that particular states would pursue the state-agency
audit committee certification product depends on a theory of state corporation law
production. The traditional models—race to the bottom or top or an interest group
model—offer ready predictions. If a race to the bottom best explains state corporation
law production, states are unlikely to support the concept to the extent it imposes
discipline and transparency on management. If a race to the top or an interest group
model, then states are likely to embrace the concept. They would embrace the concept
under the race to the top to the extent it lowers the cost of capital by reducing agency
costs and serves the interests of capital markets and investors. They would embrace it
under the interest group theory to the extent it produces additional revenue for states and
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their lawyers, keeping services in the legal profession and out of the auditing and
accounting professions.
Predictions of state inclination are more difficult if one embraces the two
variations on the model, which appear increasingly more capacious and accurate
descriptions of the observed federalization of corporate governance production. Under
the vertical competition model, states only act when pressured and the federal machinery
can nearly always directly or indirectly preempt them. The only way to prevent this is to
fall into line; the state-agency concept would constitute an innovation rather than a
capitulation. Under the disguised-federalization model, states may have a role, but may
lack incentives to play it. A limited incentive is to genuinely compete with the federal
apparatus in standard-setting leadership, but the federal hand is so powerful that this
would require unusual political fortitude.
Within some states, such political skill might exist. States are not necessarily
monolithic. They are political institutions populated by people holding differing views.
Within a state, some lawyers and judges may favor the concept while others oppose it.
Supporters could recognize that using a state agency along with the judiciary could cause
a friendly internal competition as the state’s standard-bearer. If the state agency achieved
a degree of national recognition as a thought and practice leader in good corporate
governance, within the boundaries afforded by state corporation law, this could
incrementally induce superior judicial decision-making as well. States could compete
with the federal apparatus in a real vertical competition amounting to a race to the top—
when next season’s scandals hit states could blame the federal machinery.

CONCLUSION
Auditing Standard No. 2’s emphasis on audit committee effectiveness returns
federal law’s ambitions for audit committees to the foundation, to state corporation law
from which directors get their power and duties. The federal return to state corporation
law leaves an incomplete and possibly incoherent corporate governance system. The
incompleteness is epitomized by the federal emphasis on audit committee effectiveness
and the lack of a mechanism—state, federal or private—to provide requisite assurance.
The example and analysis underscores the limits of half-measures. If the federal
approach leaves open such an obvious hole in the framework, then it is just as deficient as
the state corporation law it purports to correct. Either the federal regime must be
complete and fully preempt state corporation law or states must be given incentives and
space to participate in developing corporate governance. Congressional reticence against
complete preemption of state corporation law suggests need to give states space,
incentives and support to contribute meaningfully to improving corporate governance.
State-agency audit committee certifications provide a vehicle for state
contributions. The concept would form a logical part of a complex—and unplanned—
regulatory model of corporate governance production. It would embrace an emerging
horizontal competition among different types of competitors, invigorate vertical
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competition between state and federal producers, reinvigorate interstate competition and
ignite intrastate competition. Getting these processes rolling would require only a single
state to move first. Getting a state to move would probably require lobbying by the
private-sector leaders likely to be supportive, including financial statement users and
preparers as well as the auditing and legal professions.
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